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Outpatient Status: Beyond The Term
Of Commitment
Under current California law, persons convicted of a crime but
"found to be not guilty by reason of insanity"' (hereinafter referred to
as NGIs) must be committed to a state hospital or other treatment facil-
ity in lieu of criminal punishment.2 The maximum term of commitment
for the NGI, as prescribed in Section 1026.5 of the California Penal
Code, is the longest term of imprisonment that could have been im-
posed for the offense or offenses for which the person was convicted.3
Section 1026.5 specifically declares that a person may not be kept in
actual custody for longer than the maximum term of confinement.4
The California Supreme Court in In re Moye 5 held that the period of
actual custody does not include time served on outpatient status.6 Ac-
cordingly, Moye can be interpreted as permitting a court to impose7
1. In law, the term "insanity" is used to denote that degree of mental illness that negates the
individual's legal responsibility or capacity. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 714 (5th ed. 1979).
Seegeneraly A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 387-90 (2d ed. 1949). Since the word
"insanity" lacked scientific sanction or precise meaning in English common law, its interpretations
varied greatly in different jurisdictions. In an effort to clarify the meaning of "insanity," a succes-
sion of jurists and legal commentators, beginning in the seventeenth century, devised different
"tests" for determining the kind and degree of insanity that excuses a person from criminal re-
sponsibility. See generally A. MATTHEWS, JR., MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 12-
22 (1970). The tests that American courts have applied in determining insanity include the
M'Naughten rule, the Durham rule and the American Law Institute test for insanity.
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026(a) (the defendant must have been found insane at the time
of the commission of the offense to assert the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity). See
generally PROPOSITION 8 on the June 1982 ballot (copy on file at the Paciflc Law Journal). This
proposition, referred to as "The Victims' Bill of Rights," requires that NGIs must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that they are incapable of knowing or understanding the nature
and quality of their acts and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of
the offense.
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5(a)(1) (the maximum term includes the upper term of the
base offense and any enhancements and consecutive offenses).
4. See id See generally id §1026.5(b)(1). The maximum term of confinement, however, can
be extended by the court if the defendant is found to have committed a serious crime and is
determined to be a danger to others.
5. 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978).
6. Persons under voluntary or involuntary outpatient treatment are considered to be on out-
patient status. See id at 467, 584 P.2d at 1103, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 497. See generally Note, Commit-
ment and Release of Persons Found Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Georgia Perspective 15
GA. L. REV. 1065, 1101-02 (1981).
7. See generally telephone conversation with Norman Black, an attorney for the legal office
of the State Department of Mental Health, Dec. 3, 1981. Outpatient status is usually granted and
not imposed because the required recommendations of the treatment facility and the county direc-
tor would normally not be initiated without the patient's approval (notes on fie at the Pacfic Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Black conversation].
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outpatient status on NGIs beyond their commitment periods.8 Moye,
however, also can be interpreted as allowing the granting or imposition
of outpatient status only during the commitment period.9 Since the
precise meaning of Moye is uncertain, persons released from commit-
ment may be forced unjustly to participate in an outpatient treatment
program.
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that the court lacks
authority to impose outpatient status on NGIs after their maximum
terms of commitment have expired. This will be achieved by a showing
of the lack of support for the view that outpatient status can be imposed
beyond the commitment period and by an illustration of the unconsti-
tutionality of this action.
This comment will begin by providing the reader with a review of
the development and current status of the laws pertaining to commit-
ment. The ambiguities in the application of these laws will be revealed
in a discussion of the impact of In re Moye. Next, the comment will
review relevant statutory law in an effort to determine the proper inter-
pretation of Moye. An application of an equal protection analysis then
will be applied to conclude that the court can not constitutionally fix
outpatient status beyond the commitment period. Finally, this com-
ment will propose legislative amendments that would clarify the statu-
tory law pertaining to the release of committed persons and the
imposition of outpatient status, thereby removing the ambiguity of
Moye. To enable a better understanding of whether the court can im-
pose outpatient status beyond the commitment period, the laws per-
taining to commitment in California first must be examined.
THE COMMITMENT LAWS
The laws pertaining to commitment include law that authorizes the
confinement of criminal offenders for treatment purposes and law that
limits these confinement periods. This section will review the develop-
ment and current status of these commitment laws. In addition, this
section will discuss the ambiguity in the application of the commitment
laws that was caused by Moye.
8. See generally hearing to determine outpatient status of a committed person, People v.
Johnson, No. 49398, 24 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981). The judge determined that he did have
the authority to impose outpatient status upon the committed person even after the commitment
period had ended [hereinafter cited as Johnson hearing].
9. See Black conversation, supra note 7; telephone conversation with Rick Mandella, Office
of Forensic Services, State Department of Mental Health, Jan. 7, 1982. The courts interpret the
Moye decision as permitting the imposition of outpatient status only during the commitment pe-
riod (notes on file at the PacKfic Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Mandella conversation].
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A. Laws Authorizing Commitment
Since persons adjudicated mentally disordered sex offenders1" (here-
inafter referred to as MDSOs) under prior law were subject to the im-
position of outpatient status, a determination of the meaning of Moye
will also affect MDSOs." Thus, a review of the laws pertaining to
commitment of NGIs and MDSOs is relevant to the understanding of
the impact of Moye. The purpose of this subsection is to provide an
overview of the laws that authorize commitment and placement of out-
patient status for criminal offenders found insane at the time of the
commission of their offenses.
Prior to 1982, the law that authorized the commitment of MDSOs
was substantially similar to the law that authorized the commitment of
NGIs. t2 An MDSO was allowed 3 to be committed to a state hospital
or other treatment facility if the court found that the person would ben-
efit from treatment.' 4 In 1982, all laws relating to the MDSO program
were repealed.' 5 Existing law, however, still provides for the commit-
ment of persons found guilty of criminal acts but whose mental condi-
tions warrant commitment in lieu of criminal punishment.
16
Under California Penal Code Section 1026, NGIs can be committed
to state hospitals, public treatment facilities, or private treatment facili-
ties.17 Additionally, Section 1026 provides for the imposition of outpa-
tient status on NGIs pursuant to Title 1518 of the Penal Code.19 Under
Title 15, NGIs can be placed into outpatient status either immediately
or only after a mandatory term of commitment has been served in a
state hospital or other treatment facility.20 Although the enactment of
Section 1026 authorized the commitment of NGIs, statutory law lacked
restrictions on the length of time a person could be committed.2 ' The
10. See generally CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 547, §19, at 1525 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §6316).
11. See text accompanying note 15 infra.
12. Both MDSOs and NGIs are persons who initially have been found guilty of committing a
criminal act, but whose mental condition warrants a period of confinement for treatment in lieu of
criminal punishment. In addition, both classes of persons are subject to the imposition of outpa-
tient status during the term of commitment. See 22 Cal. 3d at 463, 584 P.2d at 1101, 149 Cal.
Rptr. at 495. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §1026 with CAL. STATS 1980, c. 547, §19(a)(1), at 1525.
13. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 547, §19(a)(1), at 1525 (the court may either order commitment
for the person or return the person to the criminal court for further disposition).
14. See id
15. See id 1981, c. 928, §2, at - (repealing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§6300-6330) (all
persons adjudicated MDSOs prior to 1982 will not be affected).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026(a).
17. See id
18. See id §§1600-1614. Title 15 deals with "outpatient status for mentally disordered and
developmentally disabled offenders."
19. See id §1026(a).
20. Seeid §1601 (the mandatory commitment term is required if the NGI was found to have
committed one of the serious crimes listed in this section).
21. See Id §1026.
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period of commitment became limited with the development of the
"maximum term of commitment."
B. Development of the "Maximum Term of Commitment"
Prior to 1977, NGIs and MDSOs were committed to state hospitals
or other treatment facilities for "indefinite" periods.22 Since no "maxi-
mum" term existed, NGIs and MDSOs remained committed until the
court determined that they had regained their sanity.23 The develop-
ment of the "maximum term of commitment" for NGIs paralleled the
development of the maximum term for MDSOs.24
The erosion of the "indefinite" period of commitment began with
two California Supreme Court decisions casting substantial doubt on
the validity of indefinite commitment periods for MDSOs in prison
treatment facilities. In People v. Feagley,26 the court held that the
state could not involuntarily confine a civilly committed MDSO for an
indefinite period when commitment was in a prison setting.' Feagle,
did not purport to invalidate indefinite commitment procedures for
MDSOs amenable to treatment in a state hospital.28 The Legislature,
however, subsequently enacted new provisions which limited the dura-
tion of all MDSO commitments.29
In 1977, Sections 6316.1 and 6316.2 were added to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.3° Section 6316.1 stipulated that an MDSO could not
be kept in "actual custody" for a period longer than the maximum term
of commitment.3 The "maximum term of commitment" was defined
as "the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed
for the offense or offenses of which the defendant was convicted, in-
cluding the upper term of the base offense and any enhancements and
consecutive offenses."32 Section 6316.2 provided for a special extended
commitment period of one year beyond the maximum term of impris-
onment following jury trial if the court found that the MDSO was a
22. See In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 463, 584 P.2d 1097, 1101, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 495 (1978).
23. See generally Black conversation, supra note 7.
24. See text accompanying notes 25-46 infra.
25. See generally 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491; People v. Burnick, 14 Cal.
3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373,
121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
26. 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509.
27. See id at 376, 535 P.2d at 398, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 534; see also 22 Cal. 3d at 463-64, 584
P.2d at 1101, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 495. An example of a prison setting is a state treatment facility
located on prison grounds.
28. See 22 Cal. 3d at 464, 584 P.2d at 1101, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
29. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 255, §63, at 570 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.1).
30. See 22 Cal. 3d at 464, 584 P.2d at 1101-02, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96; see also CAL. STATS.
1977, c. 164, §§2, 3, at 633-34 (adding CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§6316.1, 6316.2).
31. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 255, §63, at 570.
32. See id
1192
1982 / Outpatient Status
serious threat to the health and safety of others.33
In 1978, the California Supreme Court determined, in In re Moye,
34
that the principles of equal protection also prohibited institutional con-
finement of an NGI for longer than the maximum term for the under-
lying offense.35 In the absence of further legislation applicable to
commitments under Section 1026 of the Penal Code, the court author-
ized the use of Section 6316.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code for
the calculation of the maximum term of commitment. 36 In an effort to
protect society,37 the court also sanctioned the extension of the maxi-
mum term of commitment if the conclusion can be drawn that an NGI
who had served his or her maximum commitment period still remained
a danger to the health and safety of themselves or others.38 The Moye
court held that if further confinement and treatment were sought after
the expiration of the extended maximum term, the only available pro-
cedures were the civil commitment provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act39 and the outpatient supervision programs.4°
As a result of the court's decision in Moye, the Legislature enacted
Penal Code Section 1026.5 in 1979.41 Like Section 6316.1 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code, Penal Code Section 1026.5 provides for a
"maximum term of commitment" for NGIs to limit the period that they
may be kept in actual custody.42 Section 1026.5 specifies different for-
mulas and procedures for determining the maximum terms of commit-
ment, depending upon the severity of the offense and the date on which
it was committed.43 In addition, Section 1026.5 establishes the criteria
33. See id c. 992, §2(d), (1), at 3380 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316.2, urgency
clause effective Sept. 22, 1979, operative Jan. 1, 1980). The trial must be by jury unless waived by
both the patient and the prosecuting attorney. See -enerally id §2(h) (the extended commitment
period may be renewed). See also %lack conversation, supra note 7.
34. 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978).
35. See id at 460, 584 P.2d at 1099, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
36. See id at 466, 584 P.2d at 1103, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 497 (the court held that the principles of
equal protection require that NGIs be treated like MDSOs with regard to the maximum term of
commitment).
37. See 11 PAC. L. J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1979 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 445, 448 (1980)
(criminal procedure; commitment and release of persons acquitted by reason of insanity) [herein-
after cited as Commitment and Release].
38. See 22 Cal. 3d at 467, 584 P.2d at 1103-04, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98; CAL. PENAL CODE
§1026.5(b)(6), (8) (the term of commitment can be extended by a two-year period an indefinite
number of times). See generally Black conversation, supra note 7.
39. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5000-5371 (the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act establishes
procedures, guidelines, and requirements which must be met before persons can be civilly
committed).
40. See 22 Cal. 3d at 460, 584 P.2d at 1099, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (this statement by the court
can be used to argue that the imposition of outpatient status beyond the term of commitment is
within the authority of the court).
41. See 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 23, 27 (1981).
42. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5(a); 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 23, 27 (1981).
43. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5(a); Commitment and Release, supra note 37, at 447. See
generally 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 199, 199-200 (1980).
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for the extension of commitment beyond the maximum term." Since
the term "actual custody" lacks statutory definition, 45 courts have
adopted the Moye definition of actual custody in applying Section
1026.5 to NGIs and MDSOs. 6 The Moye holding, however, is the
source of considerable confusion.
C. The Area of Confusion
Although statutory law authorizes the courts to impose outpatient
status on NGIs, considerable confusion exists regarding when this sta-
tus may be imposed. The solution to this problem lies in the proper
interpretation of Moye.
The language used in Penal Code Section 1026.5 and in the recently
repealed Welfare and Institutions Code Section 6316.1 indicates that
the definition of "actual custody" is critical in determining the court's
ability to impose restrictions on an NGI beyond the maximum term of
commitment.47 The Moye court held that actual custody did not in-
clude periods of outpatient supervision.48 Thus, Moye can be inter-
preted to mean that persons who have served their maximum periods
of commitment may be placed on outpatient status.49 This interpreta-
tion is reinforced by the language in the Moye opinion. The court
stated that the only available procedures for further confinement after
the expiration of an extended commitment term are the civil commit-
ment provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and the outpatient
treatmentprogramsY° Commentators, however, have interpreted Moye
as holding that outpatient status may be imposed onlyprior to or during
the NGI's term of commitment.5 1 Commentators have analogized the
imposition of outpatient status as stopping the "clock" that measures
the time left to be served on an NGrs commitment period. 2 The
"clock" is reactivated at the end of the outpatient period 53 if the court
determines that the NGI is to be recommitted.54 In no event, however,
44. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5(a); Commitment and Release, supra note 37, at 447.
45. See generall, CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5.
46. See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
47. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5(a)(1), (2), (3); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§6316.1(a), (b), (c).
48. See In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 461, 584 P.2d 1097, 1101, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 495 (1978).
49. See generally Johnson hearing, supra note 8, at 24; 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 491 (outpatient status constitutes constructive custody).
50. See 22 Cal. 3d at 460, 584 P.2d at 1099, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
51. See Black conversation, supra note 7; Mandella conversation, supra note 9. See generally
64 Op. Att'y Gen. 23, 28-29 (1981).
52. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9.
53. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1606 (although outpatient status is limited to a one-
year period, it may be renewed indefinitely).
54. An example may be useful to the understanding of this concept. Assume A has been
committed to a state hospital for a term of five years. At the end of the fourth year of commit-
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may the outpatient status be imposed after the commitment period has
expired. 55 The different interpretations of the Moye holding have led
to considerable confusion over the court's authority to impose outpa-
tient status on NGIs who have served their maximum terms of commit-
ment. While an examination of the laws pertaining to commitment has
revealed that outpatient status can be imposed prior to, and during, the
maximum term of commitment, the Moye definition of "actual cus-
tody" has raised the question of whether courts can impose outpatient
status beyond the commitment period.
At present, Moye is the only case that addresses the issue of the
court's authority to impose outpatient status beyond the commitment
period. Thus, a thorough examination of the relevant statutory and
constitutional law is necessary to determine whether the court can au-
thorize outpatient status for an NGI after the maximum term of com-
mitment has been served. This comment will now analyze the statutory
law of California in an effort to determine the precise meaning of
Moye. In addition, this comment will use an equal protection analysis
to determine the constitutional validity of a law that permits the impo-
sition of outpatient status on NGIs who have fully served their terms of
commitment.
THE VOID IN EXISTING STATUTORY LAW
Existing statutory law does not provide a definitive answer to the
question of whether the court has authority to impose outpatient status
beyond the commitment period. No statutory provision exists that
either prohibits the imposition of outpatient status after the commit-
ment period has expired,56 or expressly grants the courts this author-
ity.57 Although certain sections of the Penal Code can be read as
granting the court authority to impose outpatient status beyond the
commitment period,5" the ambiguity of the statutes makes this interpre-
tation unpersuasive.5 9
Sections 1600 and 1612 of Title 15 of the Penal Code can be cited as
authority for the court to impose outpatient status upon NGIs who
have fully served their terms of commitment. Section 1600 provides
ment, A is placed on outpatient status. At the end of the one-year term of outpatient status, the
court has the options of renewing outpatient status, returning A to the state hospital for the re-
maining term, or releasing A without condition. Should the court decide that A has drastically
regressed and may be a danger to others, it can return A to the state hospital for the remaining
year left on A's five-year commitment period. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9.
55. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9.
56. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§1026-1026.5, 1600-1614.
57. See generallyid §§1026, 1026.5, 1600-1614.
58. See generally id §§1026.3, 1600, 1612.
59. See text accompanying notes 60-68 infra.
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that any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility
as an NGI or an MDSO can be placed on outpatient status "from such
commitment" subject to the procedures and provisions of Title 15.60
Since the language "from such commitment" 61 can be interpreted as
"after the end of the commitment period," one can argue that this sec-
tion specifically permits outpatient status to be imposed after the com-
mitment period. The statute, however, does not state that the
committed person can be placed on outpatient status "from the end of
commitment." Thus, the phrase "from such commitment" could also
be interpreted as meaning "from the existing term of commitment."
62
Accordingly, absent a legislative or judicial determination of the mean-
ing of the statutory language of "from such commitment," the phrase
can not be interpreted convincingly as meaning "after the end of the
commitment period."
Section 1612 of the Penal Code provides that any person who is com-
mitted to a state hospital or other treatment facility as an NGI or an
MDSO shall not be released therefrom except as expressly provided
under the outpatient provisions of Title 15.63 Since the language of
Section 1612 states that committed NGIs and MDSOs can be released
only under the outpatient status provisions, committed persons, argua-
bly, cannot be directly released from their commitment without first
being placed on outpatient status. Section 1026.1 of the Penal Code,
however, may conflict with this interpretation of the language in Sec-
tion 1612." Section 1026.1 enumerates different criteria for the release
of NGIs from commitment.6' These standards are that a person com-
mitted to a state hospital or other treatment facility must be released
upon a determination that sanity has been restored, 66 upon an expira-
tion of the maximum term of commitment,67 or as otherwise expressly
provided under the outpatient status provisions of Title 15.68
In summary, while statutory law does not prohibit the imposition of
outpatient status upon an NGI after expiration of the confinement pe-
riod, no provision of existing law unequivocally supports the view that
the court has the authority to impose outpatient status beyond the max-
imum term of commitment. Thus, neither case law nor statutory law
60. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1600 (emphasis added).
61. See generally id §1026.3 (this section also contains the "from such commitment"
language).
62. See generally id §1604 (recommendations for eligibility of outpatient status are made
during the term of commitment).
63. See I d §1612.
64. See Id §1026.1.
65. See id
66. See i d §1026.1(a).
67. See id §1026.1(b).
68. Seeid §1026.1(c).
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can be used to determine the precise meaning of Moye. The proper
interpretation of Moye, however, can be determined through an exami-
nation of the constitutional validity of a law that permits the imposition
of outpatient status beyond the term of commitment.
AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution guar-
antees each person the right to equal protection under the law.
69 Al-
though this right does not guarantee that every law shall treat every
person equally,7" it does require that laws treating one class of people
differently from another class be justified under an equal protection
analysis. 71 A law that permits the imposition of outpatient status upon
NGIs beyond their terms of commitment would result in a discrimina-
tory classification by permitting NGIs to be treated differently from
persons who are found guilty of the same crime and sent to jail. Pris-
oners in jail would be required to be released directly from jail after
fully serving their sentences; NGIs, however, would be subject to out-
patient status beyond their terms of commitment.72 Accordingly, even
if case law73 or statutory law7a can be interpreted to authorize courts to
impose outpatient status upon NGIs after their commitment period has
ended, the constitutional validity of that law must be justified under an
equal protection analysis.75 The constitutionality of the law depends
upon the standard of analysis applied and the findings of the court in
that application.76
A. The Appropriate Standard of Analysis
The appropriate standard for equal protection analysis depends
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
70. See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
71. See id at 335 (the standard applied depends upon the interests affected or the classifica-
tion involved).
72. An example may be useful to the understanding of this concept. Assume A and B are
both found guilty of the same type of crime. If only A were found to be insane at the time of the
commission of the crime, A would be committed to a treatment facility or be placed on outpatient
status as an NGI. B would be sent to jail. Assuming the maximum penalty for the crime was a
five-year term of imprisonment, both A and B can be confined for a period of five years. At the
end of the five-year period, B would be absolutely free. A, however, might be required to partici-
pate in an outpatient treatment program. This results in discriminatory treatment to A.
The imposition of outpatient status beyond the term of commitment differs from the granting of
parole to persons in prison. Parole is granted while the prisoner still has time to serve on the
sentence and cannot be imposed after the sentence has expired. Moreover, outpatient status is
limited to a one-year period, but it may be renewed indefinitely.
73. See generally In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978).
74. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§1026.3, 1600, 1612.
75. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
76. See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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upon the type of rights infringed." When fundamental rights are de-
nied, the court must apply a strict scrutiny standard.78  The court in
Livingston v. Ewing79 held that fundamental rights are those rights
guaranteed implicitly or explicitly by the Constitution." Hence, the
right to liberty and the right to travel are fundamental rights.3 1 The
imposition of outpatient status is an infringement of a person's funda-
mental rights to liberty and travel.
The court in Bolling v. Sharpe82 held that the term "liberty" is not
confined to mere freedom of bodily restraint.83 Liberty extends to the
full range of lawful conduct that the individual desires to pursue.84
Outpatients are either required to be housed at the outpatient facility or
to check into the facility periodically.8 Regardless of where the outpa-
tients live, they must comply with the rules and regulations that the
facility has imposed on them. 6 Since the choices of where to live and
what one can do are included in the right to liberty,8 7 the imposition of
outpatient status constitutes an infringement upon that right.
The constitutional right to travel includes the right to move from one
state to another.8 8 Outpatients, however, are not permitted to move out
of state and, perhaps, may not move from county to county.89 Outpa-
tient status, therefore, also infringes on the NGI's right to travel. Since
the fixing of outpatient status is an infringement on the fundamental
interests of liberty and right to travel, a strict scrutiny standard of anal-
ysis must be applied under an equal protection challenge.90
77. See id at 335. See generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1972). The court must apply a strict scrutiny test for "suspect" classifications. In determining
whether a class is suspect, the court traditionally looks for an indication that the class is saddled
with such disabilities or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness, as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. NGIs, however, do not fit within this definition and thus cannot be
considered a suspect classification. See generally Note, Commitment and Release of Persons Found
Not Guil y By Reason f Insanit: .4 Georgia Perspective, 15 GA. L. Rav. 1065, 1082 n.94 (1981).
See note 71 supra.
78. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
79. 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978).
80. See id at 831.
81. See 394 U.S. at 629-31; ln re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 465, 584 P.2d 1097, 1102-03, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 491, 496-97 (1978); People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 243-51, 551 P.2d 375, 379-84, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 55, 59-64 (1976); U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV, §1.
82. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
83. See id at 499-500.
84. See id at 499.
85. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9.
86. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9 (these restrictions vary from case to case).
87. See text accompanying notes 83 and 84 supra.
88. See generally Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
89. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9 (an outpatient is not allowed to move to another
county unless that other county has an adequate treatment facility that is willing to be responsible
for that outpatient).
90. See generally In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978).
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B. The Strict Scrutiny Test
Under a strict scrutiny standard, a law is valid only if the distinctions
drawn by the law are necessary to effectuate a "compelling state inter-
est."'" Accordingly, the court must find that California has a compel-
ling state interest in the imposition of outpatient status beyond the term
of commitment. In addition, the court must also determine that the
imposition of outpatient status is necessary to that interest before the
action can be deemed constitutionally valid.
A "compelling state interest" has been defined broadly as an interest
the state is forced or obliged to protect.92 From this general definition,
the courts of different states have found many varied interests to be
"compelling."93 In People v. Saffell,94 the California Supreme Court
held the MDSO procedures of the state were justified by the dual95
compelling interests of assuring the safety of the public and of provid-
ing effective treatment96 for those disposed to the commission of this
particular category of criminal conduct.97 Accordingly, one court of
appeal has interpreted the Saffell decision as holding that the state has
a compelling interest in the confinement of persons for the purpose of
treatment.
98
The defendant, in Saffell, was convicted of forcible rape and forcible
sexual perversion, both offenses aggravated by the use of a dangerous
weapon. 99 The Saffell court noted that confining MDSOs for the pur-
pose of treatment, rather than punishing them through confinement in
a state prison, is not a violation of equal protection.'00 The court's ra-
tionale, however, probably was based on the premise that the defend-
91. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); 394 U.S. at 634; 22 Cal. 3d at 465, 584
P.2d at 1102-03, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97.
92. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (5th ed. 1979) (the term "compelling state
interest" is used to uphold state action in the face of an attack grounded on equal protection or
first amendment rights because of the serious need for state action).
93. See generally People v. Saffell, 25 Cal. 3d 223, 599 P.2d 92, 157 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1979) (the
state has a dual compelling interest in protecting the public and providing treatment for the men-
tally ill); State v. Coleman, 616 P.2d 1090 (Mont. 1980) (the state has a compelling interest in
eliminating the sale of methamphetamines); Coleman v. Coleman, 291 N.E.2d 530 (Ohio 1972)
(the state has a compelling interest in overseeing its divorce and marriage laws); Wallegham v.
Thompson, 185 N.W.2d 649 (N. Dakota 1971) (the state has a compelling interest in constructing
water control devices in those parts of the state susceptible to flooding).
94. 25 Cal. 3d 223, 599 P.2d 92, 157 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1979).
95. The phrase "dual compelling interests" can imply separate and independent compelling
interests. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
96. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of treatment); see
also Goodrich v. Tinker, 437 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex. 1969).
97. See 25 Cal. 3d at 232-33, 599 P.2d at 97, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
98. See People v. Smith, 120 Cal. App. 3d 817, 821, 175 Cal. Rptr. 54, 55-56 (1981).
99. See 25 Cal. 3d at 227, 599 P.2d at 94, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
100. See 120 Cal. App. 3d 817 at 821, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56.
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ant would be confined, whether in a prison or a hospital setting.1°1
Since confinement was imminent, the court unnecessarily identified the
interests of treatment of the MDSO and the protection of the public as
separate and independent compelling state interests. Accordingly, the
Saffell case should not be interpreted to mean that treatment, in itself,
is a sufficiently compelling state interest for confinement purposes.
The interest of the state in protecting its citizens may be a "compel-
ling" one.'02 The state, nonetheless, cannot validly claim an interest in
the protection of its citizens as the basis for the imposition of outpatient
status because persons found to be harmful to themselves or others are
ineligible for outpatient status.' 3 The purpose of outpatient status is to
ensure that the previously committed individuals will be treated prop-
erly so that they can successfully re-enter society. 1 4 Although the in-
terest of the state in the treatment' of its citizens is commendable, this
interest is secondary' and should not rise to the level of a necessary or
compelling state interest. Thus, the state would lack a sufficient interest
to justify the authorization of the imposition of outpatient status be-
yond the term of commitment.
Even if the state could show that mere treatment is a compelling in-
terest, it would additionally have to illustrate that the challenged proce-
dure was necessary for the attainment of its goals.' 0 6 This requirement
can not be fulfilled if the court finds that the state action does not fur-
ther the interest of the state or that alternatives to the state action are
available to achieve the same goals with a lesser burden on constitu-
tionally protected activities.'
0 7
Commentators doubt that the imposition of outpatient status beyond
the term of commitment will further the state's interest of treatment. 08
One of the conditions precedent to placing an MDSO or an NGI on
outpatient status is that the county mental health director make the
proper recommendations and treatment program suggestions to the
court.109 The program suggestions, which include the naming of the
proposed treatment facility for the committed person, are weighed
101. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1601 (since the defendant's crimes were serious, he would not be
eligible for outpatient status until at least 90 days of commitment had been served).
102. See generally People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
Although confinement of MDSOs is not "solely' for the protection of society, the protection of
society is the primary purpose of confinement. Rehabilitative treatment is, at best, only a secon-
dary purpose for confinement. See text accompanying notes 94-101 supra.
103. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1602(a), 1603(a).
104. See generall, id §§1602(a), (b), (c), 1603(a), (b).
105. See 14 Cal. 3d at 361, 535 P.2d at 388, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
106. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
107. See id
108. See text accompanying notes 109-113 infra.
109. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1602(b), 1603(b); Mandella conversation, supra note 9.
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heavily at the hearing to determine if outpatient status should be
granted to the particular individual.1 Commentators have suggested,
however, that facilities that treat outpatients would be unwilling to as-
sume treatment responsibility for an outpatient when that person can
no longer be returned to commitment."' If the county mental health
director is unable to find a suitable facility to accept treatment respon-
sibility,1 2 the person released from commitment will not receive treat-
ment.11 Accordingly, the interest of the state in ensuring treatment for
persons released from commitment would not be realized.
Assuming arguendo that outpatient treatment facilities were required
to accept responsibility for persons to be placed on outpatient status,
alternatives to the imposition of outpatient status beyond the 'commit-
ment period may be shown to defeat an assertion that imposition of
outpatient status is "necessary" to achieve the state's desired goal.'1
One alternative is for the court simply to urge persons released from
commitment to seek outpatient treatment. One commentator has sug-
gested that some released patients would be willing to follow the court's
recommendation." 5 A second alternative is for the court to extend the
term of commitment. This permits outpatient status to be imposed be-
yond the original term of commitment." 6 The term of commitment
may be extended only if the NGI has committed a serious crime" 7 and
is found to be a substantial danger to others." 8 Many courts, however,
have used the rationale that an NGI is dangerous if released without
outpatient treatment to satisfy the "danger" requirement for extending
commitment.' A third alternative is for the legislature to raise the
maximum term of imprisonment allowable for all offenses. 120  This
110. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9.
Ill. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9. See generally Johnson hearing, supra note 8
(the court doubted its ability to impose contempt of court sanctions upon outpatients whose com-
mitment terms have already ended).
112. See generally telephone conversation with Kathy Fagarstrom, Acting Chief of the Statis-
tics Office at the State Department of Mental Health, Dec. 7, 1981. There are over 1000 treatment
facilities in California. They are either operated by the county or contracted with the county. Of
those, there are only 17 or 18 treatment facilities that specifically handle outpatients who were
formerly MDSOs or NGIs. Last year, there were only about 500 outpatients from MDSO and
NGI commitments (notes on file at the Pacfic Law Journal).
113. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1611 (if the county does not wish to assume outpatient
treatment responsibility, the committed person may be placed on parole).
114. See text accompanying note 107 srupra.
115. See Mandella conversation, supra note 9 (a large number will submit voluntarily to out-
patient treatment at the court's request because many persons released from commitment are not
able to care for themselves).
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.5(b)(7).
117. See id §1026.5(b)(1).
118. See id
119. See generally Black conversation, supra note 7; Mandelia conversation, su ra note 9.
120. The increase in the maximum terms of imprisonment would simply give the courts
greater flexibility in the imposition of outpatient status. Persons committed to treatment facilities
may still be released before the end of the maximum term.
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would increase the maximum term of commitment for future NGIs
thereby extending the period of outpatient status that may be imposed.
Finally, the obvious alternative to the imposition of outpatient status
beyond the term of commitment is simply to begin outpatient status
before the commitment period ends. There is no dispute that the law
has authorized the court to order outpatient status before the end of the
commitment term.121 Since outpatient status may begin even one day
before the end of commitment, there is no logical reason to increase the
burden on constitutionally protected activities by waiting until the
commitment period has ended.1 22 Thus, successful alternatives to the
imposition of outpatient status beyond the term of commitment are
available to defeat the "necessary" requirement of the compelling in-
terest assertion.
Since the state cannot show successfully that its interest is compel-
ling123 or that if compelling, the procedures used are necessary to fur-
ther that interest,' 2 4 the imposition of outpatient status after the
commitment period does not pass the strict scrutiny standard of analy-
sis. 125 Accordingly, the validity of this state procedure cannot withstand
an equal protection attack. Thus, Moye should not be interpreted as
permitting the imposition of outpatient status upon NGIs who have
served their terms of commitment. To ensure the proper interpretation
of Moye, legislative amendments to existing laws that pertain to com-
mitment are proposed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed previously, 26 existing laws relevant to commitment-
and the imposition of outpatient status can be interpreted differently. 12 7
Since the imposition of outpatient status beyond the term of commit-
ment has been shown to be constitutionally invalid,128 statutory law
should be amended to expressly prohibit this procedure. To accom-
plish this clarification, Sections 1026.1, 1026.3, 1600 and 1612 of the
California Penal Code should be amended to read:12 9
§1026.1. [Release from state hospital or treatment facility]
121. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1600.
122. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 92-103 supra.
124. See text accompanying notes 106-122 supra.
125. See generaly Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978).
126. See text accompanying notes 60-68 supra.
127. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§1026.3, 1600, 1612.
128. See text accompanying notes 123-125 supra.
129. The italicized portions of the following sections are proposed amendments to the current
code sections.
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(a) A person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facil-
ity under the provisions of Section 1026 shall be released therefrom
only:
(1) Upon determination that sanity has been restored as provided
in Section 1026.1; or
(2) Upon expiration of the maximum term of commitment as pro-
vided in subdivision (a) of Section 1026.5, except as such term may
be extended under the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section
1026.5; or
(3) As otherwise expressly provided in Title 15 (commencing with
Section 1600) of Part 2.
(b) Upon expiration of the maximum term of commitment asprovided
in subdivision (a) of Section 1026.5 or the expiration of the extehded
term of commitment under the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section
1026.5, the court shall no longer have authority to impose outpatient
status upon the previously committed individual. 130
§1026.3. [Outpatient status]
A person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility
under the provisions of Section 1026 may be placed on outpatient
status from the existing term of commitment as provided in Title 15
(commencing with Section 1600) of Part 2.13 1
§1600. [Applicability]
Any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility
under the provisions of Section 1026, or Chapter 6 (commencing
with Section 1367) of Title 10 of this code, or Section 6316 or 6321 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code may be placed on outpatient status
from the existing term of commitment subject to the procedures and
provisions of this title, except that a developmentally disabled person
may be placed on outpatient status from such commitment under the
provisions of this title as modified by Section 1370A.132
§1612. [Release]
Any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility
under the provisions of Section 1026, or Chapter 6 (commencing
with Section 1367) of Title 10 of this code, or Section 6316 or 6321 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code, who isplaced on oupatient status,
shall not be releasedfrom outpatient status except as expressly pro-
vided in this title.
1 33
The addition of subsection (b) to Section 1026.1 will stipulate that im-
130. But see CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.1 (the portion in italics are proposed additions to this
code section).
131. But see id §1026.3.
132. But see id §1600 (the reference to Sections 6316 and 6321 of the code dealing with MD-
SOs have not been excluded since MDSOs committed prior to 1982 are still subject to this
section).
133. But see id §1612 (the reference to Sections 6316 and 6321 of the code dealing with MD-
SOs have not been excluded since MDSOs committed prior to 1982 are still subject to this
section).
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position of outpatient status beyond the commitment period is clearly
prohibited. Moreover, the replacement of the nebulous phrase of
"from such commitment" from Sections 1026.3 and 1600 with the
phrase "from the existing term of commitment" will remove the ambi-
guity of thesesections. Additionally, the proposed amendment to Sec-
tion 1612 will eliminate the previous conflict with Section 1026.1. By
clarifying the laws relating to the imposition of outpatient status upon
NGIs who have fully served their terms of commitment, the California
Legislature also would be ensuring a constitutionally valid interpreta-
tion of Moye.
CONCLUSION
In re Moye ha-s led to uncertainty concerning the court's authority to
impose outpatient status on NGIs beyond their terms of commitment.
This comment has examined the relevant laws in California and has
found that the statutes provide no support for the view that the court
has authority to impose outpatient status beyond the commitment pe-
riod. Although the statutes do not forbid the fixing of outpatient status
after the commitment period has terminated, the lack of support for the
view that this action is authorized indicates that the Legislature did not
intend to permit the imposition of outpatient status beyond the com-
mitment period. In addition, this comment has determined that a law
that permits the imposition of outpatient status on NGIs after their
commitment periods have expired is unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause. Since the imposition of outpatient status beyond the
commitment period is constitutionally prohibited, a better interpreta-
tion of Moye and of statutes that pertain to commitment is that outpa-
tient status can be imposed only during the NGI's term of commitment.
Thus, the Moye case should not be interpreted as permitting the impo-
sition of outpatient status on NGIs beyond their terms of commitment.
Finally, legislative amendments to current California statutes have
been proposed. Implementation of these amendments will prevent fu-
ture misinterpretations of the Moye case.
The conclusion drawn from this comment may cause unrest among
those people who believe that the prohibition of the fixing of outpatient
status beyond the commitment period will permit insufficiently treated
and possibly dangerous persons to be returned to society. One must
bear in mind, however, that NGIs determined to be dangerous are not
eligible for outpatient status. In addition, alternatives to the imposition
of outpatient status beyond the commitment period have been sug-
gested to prevent the premature release of NGIs. Thus, while this com-
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ment seeks to enhance the protection of individual rights, its impact
will neither threaten nor burden society.
Mathew K. M. Chan
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